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The trial court errored in granting plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. There is a material issue of fact as to 
whether defendants substantially complied with the 15-day Notice. 
I. CORRECTION IN FACTS SECTION 
Paragraph 2 and 7 of "Facts'' section in appellants' brief 
should be corrected as follows (reflecting that the 15-day Notice 
was serviced on Veda Dare and Rick Nebeker on November 1, 1996 
not October 29, 1996): 
2. On November 1, 1996, All Seasons served Dare and 
Nebeker with a "Landlord's 15-day Notice" pursuant to 
Section 57-16-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953. (R. 14) 
7. By November 22, 1996, 6 days after the 15-day 
Notice had run, Dare and Nebeker had not been able to 
complete painting of the shed. Dare and Nebeker had to 
wait until the weather was warm enough and dry enough 
to paint the shed. When the shed was painted, the rain 
streaked the shed and the shed had to be repainted. 
(R.193.) 
II. THE MOBILE HOME PARK RESIDENCY ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT 
THE COMMON LAW DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE. 
Plaintiff's sole argument that the doctrine of substantial 
performance does not apply to compliance with a 15-day Notice is 
Cresentwood Village, Inc. v. Johnson, 909 P.2d 1267 (Utah App. 
1995). Plaintiff claims that in Cresentwood this Court held that 
the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act preempted the doctrine of 
doctrine of substantial performance as it applies to compliance 
with a landlord's "15-day Notice" issued pursuant to the Utah 
Mobile Home Park Residency Act. This is absolutely false. 
In Cresentwood, this Court held that where a tenant complies 
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with a 15-day Notice, but thereafter repeatedly violates park 
rules, the park is not required to give further notice before 
bringing an action for eviction. In Cresentwood, the mobile home 
park served a 15-day Notice on a tenant which stated that "should 
[the tenant] in the future again violate the above rules or a 
different rule of the park, this will result in forfeiture of 
your lease and eviction without any further period of cure" Id. 
at 1269. The tenant complied with the 15-day Notice but 
thereafter continued to violate park rules. The plaintiff filed 
an action to terminate the lease based on the later violations 
without any further cure period. Defendant argued that, under 
common law, the mobile home park was required to give the tenant 
an additional notice, although not required by statute, of its 
intention to terminate the lease if there were further 
violations. The court held that because the Utah Mobile Home 
Park Residency Act did not require any additional notice to be 
given, no such notice was required. 
Although Cresentwood did not directly address whether the 
doctrine of "substantial performance" applies to a 15-day Notice, 
indirectly the court acknowledged that it does. In describing 
the trial court's finding that the tenant had complied with the 
original 15-day Notice, the Cresentwood Court stated as follows: 
Eventually, on May 6, 1993, CVI served 
Johnson with a 15-day eviction notice for 
rule violations. That notice required 
Johnson to cure three violations if she were 
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to avoid eviction. After receiving the 
notice, Johnson timely cured the unlicensed 
vehicle violation and the mobile home 
painting violation. Johnson also 
substantially cured the violation related to 
the keeping of her lot neat, clean and weed 
free, removing most, but not all the garbage 
and weeds. 
Id. at 221. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the court found that the 15-day Notice had been complied 
with, upon a finding that Johnson had removed "most, but not all, 
garbage and weeds" and "substantially cured" the violation. 
There is no provision in the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency 
Act expressly preempting the doctrine of substantial performance 
as it applies to compliance with a 15-day Notice. Furthermore, 
the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act specifically provides 
that "the rights and remedies as granted by this chapter are 
cumulative and non-exclusive." Utah Code Annotated 57-16-11. 
As more fully set forth in the Brief of Appellants (see 
pages 6-8), substantial performance is the law in the State of 
Utah, and should apply to compliance with a 15-day Notice. See 
also Appendix A hereto, which is Model Utah Jury Instruction 
26.21 — the substantial performance jury instruction approved 
for use in jury trials throughout the State of Utah. 
III. THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The trial court errored in granting summary judgment in this 
case inasmuch as there is a material issue of fact in dispute. 
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Because a jury could find that the defendants "substantially 
complied" with the 15-day Notice, the trial court errored in 
granting summary judgment. 
Based on the facts in the record and the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, a jury could reasonably 
conclude as follows: 
1. Prior to being served with the 15-day Notice on 
November 1, 1996, Rick Nebeker and Veda Dare had lived 
in the mobile home park for 18 months, were not late on 
rent and did not violate park rules.1 
2. On November 1, 1996, defendants received a 15-day 
Notice and immediately and fully complied with five of 
the seven items.2 
3. The remaining two items were to have the "shed 
painted" and to store items in the back yard and around 
the mobile home "in your shed or in your home."3 
4. Upon receiving the 15-day Notice on November 1, 1996, 
and prior to the expiration of the 15 days, defendants took 
the following actions to comply with these two items: 
a. Purchased paint and paint rollers;4 
Plaintiff has not alleged in the Complaint or in the 
"Statement of Undisputed Facts" in plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment any previous rule violations or failure to pay rent. (R. 
1-3, 110-111.) 
2See R. 188-190. Plaintiff has never alleged that these 5 
items were not immediately and timely complied with. (R. 110-
111.) 
3See R. 15, items 1 and 3. 
Pictures E-5, E-8, E-9, and E-10 (R. 157-58) show the paint 
and paint roller. Veda Dare testified that "[w]e commenced 
[painting] shortly after the 15-day Notice was given, but because 
of the rain problem we were not able to complete it within the 
15-days but we did complete shortly thereafter." (R. 186) See 
also R. 192-93 (Affidavit of Rick Nebeker). 
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b. Watched and waited until the weather was 
warm enough and dry enough to permit 
painting;5 
c. Painted the shed, which was streaked by 
rain before it could dry;6 
d. Watched and waited until weather 
permitted repainting;7 
e. Moved 2 wicker chairs, one table, one 
umbrella, one wicker basket and one patio 
chair out of the back yard and indoors;8 
g. Obtained permission from park manager to 
cover with a tarp certain items that would 
not fit in the shed or could not be taken 
indoors.9 
5. On November 17, 1996, the day the 15-day Notice 
expired, defendants were still trying to repaint the 
shed in adverse weather. Once the shed was repainted, 
the remaining items in the yard were immediately stored 
in the shed and the remaining items were covered with a 
5See paragraph 5 of Veda Dare Affidavit (R. 186) and 
paragraph 2 of Rick Nebeker Affidavit (R. 192-93). 
6Id. ("[W]hen it rained the rain would streak the shed and 
the shed would have to be repainted.") 
7Id. 
8In comparing Exhibit D-2 (R. 154), taken on October 2, 
1996, with Exhibits E-4, E-5, E-6, E-8, E-9 and E-10 (R. 157-58), 
taken on November 22, 1996, 2 wicker chairs, one table, one 
umbrella, one wicker basket and one patio chair have been moved. 
9Rule 9(c ) of the All Seasons Mobile home Community Good 
Neighbor Policy provides that items can be stored in the back 
yard if "approved by owner/' In this case, Rick Nebeker 
specifically asked for permission to store certain items in the 
back yard, covered by a tarp, and the manager consented. "Brenda 
Bottoms [the park manager] said that the items could be stacked 
by the house and back fence and covered, which they were." (R. 
189, 194) 
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tarp, as per permission from the park manager.10 
6. On or shortly after November 23, 1996, 7 days 
after the 15-day Notice expired, the repainting of the 
shed was completed, the remaining items were either 
stored inside or covered with a tarp (pursuant to 
permission from the park manager) and all items on the 
15-day Notice were complied with.11 
7. On December 6, 1996, the Complaint was filed.12 
8. The February 21, 1997, pictures demonstrate that 
everything in the 15-day Notice had been complied 
with.13 
9. The May 12, 1997, pictures were taken while 
defendants were spring-cleaning their shed and are 
irrelevant to anything in this case.14 
Attached hereto as Appendix B is an integration of the foregoing 
with plaintiff's photographs, demonstrating how the photographs 
corroborate the foregoing. 
Based on the foregoing, a jury could determine that 
defendants had "substantially complied" with the 15-day Notice. 
10See R. 1 9 2 - 9 3 . 
11
 I d . 
12See R. 1 . 
13Exhibits E-4, E-5, E-6, E-8, E-9 and E-10 (R. 157-58) show 
that the remaining items in the yard have either been stored or 
covered with a tarp (as per agreement with park manager). 
14Exhibits G-l, G-2 and G-3 were taken while defendants were 
spring cleaning the shed. "Brenda Bottoms apparently waited 
until we were in the process of spring cleaning the shed and then 
took these pictures. Roger Strader came over during the course 
of one or two days we had pulled everything out of the shed and 
then moved everything back into the shed while we were cleaning. 
There are pictures of the items that were in the shed when they 
were pulled out and we were cleaning the shed." Paragraph 13, 
Affidavit of Veda Dare. (R. 188.) 
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The jury could reason that the only breach was a short delay in 
complying with two items in the 15-day Notice -- the painting the 
shed and storing items in the shed. In evaluating the "facts and 
circumstances/" the jury could find that defendants did 
"everything they could to comply" during the 15 days, had only 
been barred by weather from timely completing these two items, 
and therefore made a "good faith" effort to comply.15 
Furthermore, time was not "of the essence" and it was at 
plaintiff's request that the outdoor painting was to be done in 
November. The jury could conclude that the items were completed 
as soon as weather allowed and this delay was "minor." The jury 
could take into consideration the policy that the law does not 
favor forfeitures and will not forfeit a tenant's lease unless 
there has been a substantial breach. See Housing Authority of 
Salt Lake City vs. Delgado, 914 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah App. 1996). 
A jury could reasonably conclude that Rick Nebeker and Veda Dare 
"substantially complied" with the 15-day Notice. Because a jury 
could so conclude, granting summary judgment is error and should 
be reversed. 
15See Affidavit of Veda Dare, paragraph 5: "Since the 15-day 
Notice requested that we paint the shed we were doing everything 
we could to comply. When it rained the rain would streak the 
shed and the shed would have to be repainted. We commenced 
shortly after the 15-day Notice was given, but because of the 
rain problem we were not able to complete it within the 15-days 
but we did complete it shortly thereafter." 
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IV. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT ESTABLISHED PRIMA FACIE CASE. 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiff simply 
attaches the pictures, with no explanation of what the pictures 
mean, what they purport to represent, how they portray rule 
violations or any other explanation. Photographs do not "speak 
for themselves" and must be explained.16 
V. RULE 404(b) PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION OF LATER PHOTOGRAPHS. 
Pursuant to Rule 404 (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the 
photographs taken after the date the Complaint is filed cannot be 
used to establish a violation on the date the Complaint was 
filed. In this case, plaintiff has not introduced any evidence 
that there were any violations of the 15-day Notice on the date 
the Complaint was filed. (To the contrary, the next photographs 
taken after the date the Complaint was filed, on February 22, 
1997, shows that there was full compliance with the 15-day Notice 
as of that date.) 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Substantial performance is law in the State of Utah. It 
applies in this case. Furthermore, there is a material issue of 
fact as to whether defendants substantially complied with the 15-
day Notice. The trial court's granting of plaintiff's Motion for 
16Plaintiff's counsel tries to testify throughout the Brief 
of Appellee as to what the pictures represent. Testimony of 
counsel is not evidence. Brenda Bottoms' Affidavit only states 
that the photographs "show the rule violations complained of on 
the 15-day Notice.'' (R. 119) No further explanation is given. 
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Summary Judgment should be reversed and defendants awarded their 
attorney's fees. 
DATED this '2Q> day of January, 1998. 
ussell A. cil: 
.me 
Attorney for Veda Dare 
and Rick Nebeker 
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26 21 MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS - CIVIL 
MUJI 26.21 
SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE 
The plaintiff must prove that the plaintiff substantially 
performed the plaintiff's obligation to [describe required 
performance of the plaintiff and to whom performance was owed]. 
Proof of substantial performance means that the plaintiff must 
prove all of the following: 
1. That the plaintiff performed substantially all of what the 
contract required. 
2. That the plaintiff's performance was so nearly equivalent to 
what was bargained for that it would be unreasonable, based on all 
the facts and circumstances, to deny the plaintiff the payment of 
the contract price, less any damages for the plaintiff's failure to 
perform the remainder of the contract terms. 
3. That the plaintiff acted in good faith, and did not 
intentionally fail to comply with the terms of the contract. 
If you find that the plaintiff has proved all three of these items, 
then you must find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the 
contract price from the defendant, less any amount owing to the 
defendant resulting from the plaintiff's failure to perform all of the 
plaintiff's obligations under the contract. If you find that the 
plaintiff has not proved all of these items, then you must find the 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover the agreed contract price from 
the defendant. 
To p 
plaintif 
obligati 
requirec 
Reference 
IJI * 
Ber 
References: 
IJI §12 02 Reprinted with permission, copyright © 1991 Matthew 
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APPENDIX B 
CHRONOLOGY AND EXPLANATION OF PHOTOGRAPHS1 
1. October 2, 1996, photograph of defendants' backyard: 
2. On November 1, 1996, defendants are served with a 15-
day Notice. 
3. By November 17, 1996, all items are completed except 
painting shed and storing items in backyard in shed (or covering 
certain items with a tarp, as per manager's consent). Because of 
rain streaking the paint and inclement weather, defendants have 
not been able to complete these items. 
*The citation to the record for the foregoing facts is fully 
developed on pages 6-8 of this brief. The Court is generally 
referred to the Affidavits of Veda Dare and Rick Nebeker (R. 185-
194. 
4. November 22, 1996, photograph of defendants' backyard, 
a. 6 days after the 15-day Notice expired, defendants 
are still trying to complete repainting of the 
shed - pictures show ladder, paint roller and 
paint. 
b. The pictures show recent rain. 
c. Note that the two wicker chairs, wicker basket, 
table, umbrella and chair shown in the October 2, 
1996 picture have all been removed from the yard 
and stored. 
d. The only items remaining in the yard are those 
that will go in the shed when painting is complete 
or that will be covered by a tarp, as per the park 
manager's consent. 
5. Shortly after the foregoing pictures were taken (and 
prior to the filing of the Complaint), all remaining items in the 
15-day Notice were completed, to wit the painting of the shed was 
completed, the remaining items in the yard were either covered 
with a tarp (as per agreement) or stored in the shed. 
6. On December 12, 1996, the Complaint was filed. 
7. February 21, 1997, photographs of defendants' backyard. 
a. Photographs demonstrate that the 15-day Notice has 
been fully complied with. 
b. All items shown in the previous photographs have 
either been stored in the shed or covered with a 
tarp, as per manager consent. 
c. The "rubbermaid" package is a second shed 
purchased by defendants (yet to be assembled) to 
store additional items. 
?</ 
May 12, 1997, photographs of defendants' backyard. 
a. Defendants were spring cleaning and had emptied 
the shed. 
b. The contents of the shed were out at most 1-2 days 
while the shed was cleaned and items organized. 
c. Plaintiffs use these photographs to show 
"continuing violations" deliberately misleads the 
court. 
& &* 
